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The rise of  populist governments around the world has attracted a great 
deal of  attention from international law scholars. The field of  international 
law witnesses a range of  studies analyzing recent populist movements and 
their impact on international law, in particular, in the fields of  trade, envi-
ronment, human rights and migration. However, existing literature focusing 
on the Global South is scant. Nonetheless, as populism is essentially linked 
to nativism, jingoism, and authoritarianism, the South countries need to be 
investigated as well, given their close association with nationalism and loca-
lism especially when they came to participate in the rule-of-law dialogues. 
This article fills the gap by offering some insights to the understanding of  
populism from three perspectives: behaviors, regimes and actors, and cau-
tions that populism places global justice and rule of  law at a high stake of  
risk.
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Resumo
A ascensão de governos populistas em todo o mundo atraiu muita atenção 
de estudiosos do direito internacional. O campo do direito internacional 
testemunha uma série de estudos que analisam os movimentos populistas 
recentes e seu impacto no direito internacional, em particular, nos campos 
do comércio, do meio ambiente, dos direitos humanos e da migração. No 
entanto, a literatura existente com foco no Sul Global é escassa. Como o 
populismo está essencialmente ligado ao nativismo, chauvinismo e autorita-
rismo, os países do Sul também precisam ser investigados, dada sua estreita 
associação com o nacionalismo e o localismo, especialmente quando pas-
saram a participar dos diálogos sobre o estado de direito. Este artigo busca 
contribuir ao preencher a lacuna, oferecendo alguns insights para a compre-
ensão do populismo a partir de três perspetivas: comportamentos, regimes e 
atores, e advertências de que o populismo coloca a justiça global e o estado 
de direito em alto risco.
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1 Introduction
Populism is a theme of  the current global order. 
Populism, as a social phenomenon, is hard to define, 
let alone a legal definition. However, it is clear that the 
recent uptick in populism signals political, economic, 
social unrest and even legal disruption internationally. 
General consensus is that populism is viewed as a stru-
ggle between the people and the elites,1 as well as a ba-
cklash against the cultural, economic and legal effects 
of  globalization. In light of  the current social, political, 
and economic turmoil, rule of  law also suffers from po-
pulism at both national and international levels.
The rise of  populist governments around the world 
has attracted a great deal of  attention from internatio-
nal law scholars. The field of  international law witnesses 
a range of  studies analyzing recent populist movements 
and their impact on international law, in particular, in 
the fields of  trade,2 environment,3 human rights4 and 
migration.5 International law is often approached in a 
binary/antagonistic manner, either as a tool to ban po-
pulist-driven policies or as an instrument to allow such 
policies to thrive. This binary style of  research tends to 
simplify the populist movement, and miss more nuan-
ced accounts of  interaction and co-production of  do-
mestic regime (il)legitimacy and international ordering 
as part of  a continuum that does not fit “either/or” ac-
counts. The existing research often focuses on the Uni-
ted States (“U.S.”) and economically stronger European 
countries as these countries have experienced populist 
1 BLOOM, Peter. We live in a populist age: but who are “the 
people”?”. The Conversation, Aug. 9, 2018. Available at: https://
theconversation.com/we-live-in-a-populist-age-but-who-are-the-
people-91793.
2 COLANTONE, Italo; STANIG, Piero. The trade origins of  
economic nationalism: import competition and voting behavior in 
western Europe. American Journal of  Political Science, v. 62, n. 4, p. 
936-952, 2018.
3 BEESON, Mark. Environmental populism: the politics of  survival 
in the Anthropocene. Palgrave: MacMillan, 2019.
4 ALSTON, Philip. The populist challenge to human rights. Journal 
of  Human Rights Practice, v. 9, n. 1, p. 1-15, 2017.
5 HAYES, Alexander Rossell; DUDEK, Carolyn Marie. How radi-
cal right-wing populism has shaped recent migration policy in Aus-
tria and Germany. Journal of  Immigrant & Refugee Studies, v. 18, n. 2, 
p. 133-150, 2020.
movements due to increasing polarization in the past 
several years.6 Literature focusing on the Global South 
is scant. Nonetheless, as populism is essentially linked 
to nativism,7 jingoism,8 and authoritarianism,9 the South 
countries need to be investigated as well, given their clo-
se association with nationalism and localism especially 
when they came to participate in the rule-of-law dialo-
gues.
This article offers some insights to the understan-
ding of  populism from three perspectives: behaviors, 
regimes10 and actors.
The decade since the 2008 global financial crisis has 
been characterized by increased populism11 and skepti-
cism towards globalization.12 As a result, there is increa-
sed evidence to suggest an emerging new world order 
due to great focus of  governments on national interests 
rather than multinational solutions.
At the national level, populism gives rise to viable 
political associations, parties, and interests that have lar-
gely elicited dismissive and passive aggressive responses 
from the established political classes. Many national eco-
nomies are now framed by weaker political and regula-
tory institutions, resulting in nonmarket threats such as 
border and migration disputes, judicial arbitrariness, in-
creased regulatory uncertainty, and rising social inequa-
lity.13 Nation states, in turning themselves to regulatory 
6 NORRIS, Pippa; INGLEHART, Ronald. Cultural backlash: 
Trump, Brexit, and authoritarian populism. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2019.
7 PAPPAS, Takis S. Exchange: how to tell nativists from populists. 
Journal of  Democracy, v. 29, n. 1, p. 148-52, 2018.
8 LEMANN, Nicholas. The fate of  populism in 2018. The New Yor-
ker, Nov. 3, 2017. Available at: https://www.newyorker.com/news/
news-desk/the-fate-of-populism-in-2018.
9 CLEMENTS, Kevin P. Authoritarian populism and atavistic 
nationalism: 21st-century challenges to peacebuilding and develop-
ment. Journal of  Peacebuilding & Development, v. 13, n. 3, p. 1-6, 2018.
10 Robert Keohane calls international institutions and organiza-
tions are “regimes”, facilitating cooperation among states. KEO-
HANE, Robert O. After hegemony. Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 1984.
11 MIAN, Atif; SUFI, Amir; TREBBI, Francesco. Resolving debt 
overhang: political constraints in the aftermath of  financial crises. 
American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics, v. 6, n. 2, p. 1-28, 2014.
12 DIPPEL, Christian; GOLD, Robert; HEBLICH, Stephan. Glo-
balization and its (dis-)content: trade shocks and voting behavior. 
NBER Working Paper 21812, 2015. Available at: http://www.nber.
org/papers/w21812.
13 PASTOR, Lubos; VERONESI, Pietro. Inequality aversion, pop-
ulism, and the backlash against globalization. NBER Working Paper 
24900, 2019. Available at: http://www.nber.org/papers/w24900; 
HUFE, Paul; KABUR, Ravi; PEICHL, Andreas. Measuring unfair 







































































































or police states, have developed more laws than ever 
on migration, tax, trade, investment, technology and in-
tellectual property. At the international level, populist 
governments often take a blaming strategy14 shifting the 
liability of  political or economic governance failure to 
other political association domestically15 or other states 
internationally. When the populist countries are unable 
to achieve their objectives in bilateral or multilateral ne-
gotiations, they take unilateral actions towards others.
Populism leaders also emerged in various forms 
across a wide range of  political and geographical ter-
rain in economically weaker regimes. Their public policy 
choices can be basically labeled by unilateralism, streng-
thened by their decisions to retreat from some common 
values16 or withdraw from multilateral framework and 
international cooperation.17 Internationally, a number 
of  issues such as immigration, environmentalism, local 
protectionism and Euroscepticism have been highly po-
liticized. Populism leads to fragmentation evidenced by 
the demise of  the WTO, the ICSID, the World Bank, 
among others. The populist victories in a good number 
of  national elections further enhanced uncertainty for 
multinational enterprises pondering investment, expan-
sion opportunities, and locational choices. Arbitrary le-
gal rulings, government instability, regulatory overhaul, 
lop-sided and underdeveloped consumer markets, bia-
sed or polarized media, among others, destabilize the 
compliance regime and increase transaction costs. The-
se institutional uncertainties and weaknesses at the glo-
bal level challenge the legitimacy of  global governance 
system and constrain the decision-making process of  
multinational enterprises.
Global South is not taking a laid-back approach 
poverty. CEPR Discussion Paper 12989, 2018.
14 HAMELEERS, Michael. Framing blame: toward a better un-
derstanding of  the effects of  populist communication on populist 
party preferences. Journal of  Elections, Public Opinion and Parties, v. 28, 
n. 3, p. 380-398, 2018.
15 LISI, Marco. Populism, blame shifting and the crisis: discourse 
strategies in portuguese political parties. South European Society and 
Politics, v. 23, n. 4, p. 405-427, 2018.
16 ROTH, Kenneth. The dangerous rise of  populism: global at-
tacks on human rights values. Human Rights Watch Global Report. 
2017. Available at: https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2017/coun-
try-chapters/dangerous-rise-of-populism.
17 BUMP, Philip. Where the US has considered leaving or left in-
ternational agreements under Trump. The Washington Post, June 30, 
2018. Available at: https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/poli-
tics/wp/2018/06/29/where-the-u-s-has-considered-leaving-or-
left-international-agreements-under-trump/.
in this populism movement.18 Rather, developing and 
emerging states are striving for a better stance in the 
global market. After the global financial crisis, the emer-
gence of  sovereignty wealth funds and the revival of  
state-owned enterprises as the key players in the global 
market is drawing tremendous attention and criticism in 
the label of  state capitalism.
The article proceeds as follows. Section 2 examines 
the bilateral trade tension, with the focus on the U.S.’s 
manipulation of  unilateral sanctions and one-sided 
negotiation strategies in a rift caused by the so-called 
China’s failure to observe its WTO obligations, to maxi-
mize its own best interests and competitive advantages. 
Section 3 moves to attack intactness of  existing interna-
tional order, by analyzing the trend of  Southern states’ 
withdrawal from the ICSID and the investor-state dis-
pute settlement mechanism (ISDS). Then in Section 4 
we approach the populist issue from a country-specific 
angle, by investigating how the revival of  state capita-
lism, through its unilateral approaches to advancing na-
tional interests, has changed and will further challenge 
the existing international infrastructure order.
2  Populism and Engagement of 
Unilateralism
After the global financial crisis, populist politics have 
been on the rise. As an ideology, populism segregates 
between the “pure people” (who are left behind from 
the globalization and technological advancement) and 
the “corrupt elite” (represented by the government or 
political establishment), and disrupts the political sphe-
re across the world. In the legal sphere, the people are 
more concerned about immigration and civil rights than 
they do about redistribution of  wealth in the society to 
correct economic inequality. They are more dissatisfied 
with “others” than “us” and see “others” as the source 
of  economic inequality and social problems. This offers 
a potential explanation for a divide between the “first” 
and the rest, shifting the blame to other countries which 
stole the jobs and technologies, swallowed their manu-
facturing entities, just mention a few. This change is ha-
18 BARDHAN, Pranab. Populism in less developed countries is 









































































































ving profound effects on the global governance system 
built upon liberal democracy. The populist governments 
take a much more aggressive approach to international 
trade imbalances or other “governance deficits”. Ins-
tead of  relying on bilateral negotiations and multilateral 
structures such as the WTO, the populist approach is to 
stick to unilateral sanctions, pressing the counterparties 
to accept and adopt the pre-set agenda and standards.
In the United States, the election of  Donald Trump 
as the President has been seen as a symbolic moment 
that voters are moving towards populist leaders. The 
emerging “Trump philosophy” has been said to be an 
entire departure from multilateralist cooperation ideolo-
gies. As Professor Harold Koh observed, Trump’s ins-
tincts seem to disengage from multilateralism through 
unilateralism, or, as he calls it, “America First”.19 Under 
this worldview, the United States should only act based 
its perceived national interests other than international 
rules. This is in contrary to such views that the United 
States was founded on universal rights, and is at odds 
with foundational principles of  modern international 
law.20 To Trump supporters, by resorting to unilatera-
lism, states can and do act unilaterally to resolve, or at 
least mitigate, the failing effect of  multilateralism.
One area of  Trump’s foreign policy-making involves 
a series of  withdrawals from international agreements 
or international institutions the United States was part 
of  as indicated in Table 1 below. These withdrawals not 
only damages the health of  multilateral institutions but 
also demonstrates a backdrop of  rising populist, isola-
tionist and anti-global political sentiment.21
Table 1 - US’s Recent Withdrawals and/or Renegotia-
tions of  Multiple Arrangements
19 KOH, Harold Hongju. The Trump administration and interna-
tional law. Washburn Law Journal, v. 56, n. 413, p. 420, 2017.
20 KOH, Harold Hongju. The Trump administration and interna-
tional law. Washburn Law Journal, v. 56, n. 413, p. 420, 2017.
21 BROLMANN, Catherine M.; COLLINS, Richard; EL DROU-
BI, Sufyan; WESSEL, Ramses A. Exiting international organiza-
tions: a brief  introduction. International Organizations Law Review, v. 





1. Intermediate-Range Nuclear 
Forces Treaty 1987
Pulled out
2. Paris Agreement 2015 Pulled out
3. Trans-Pacific Partnership 
2016
Pulled out
4. South Korean Trade Deal 
(KORUS) 2012
Renegotiated22
5. NAFTA 1994 Signed the US-Mexico-
Canada Agreement to 
replace it
6. Groups of  Seven 1975, 2014 Wants to include Russia
7. Singapore Agreement 2018 Signed
8. UN Human Rights Council 
1946
Pulled out
9. UN Educational Scientific 
and Cultural Organization 
1945
Pulled out
10. Iran Nuclear Deal
(Joint Comprehensive Plan 
of  Action 2015)
Pulled out
11. Treaty of  Amity 1955 with 
Iran23
Pulled out
12. Optional Protocol under the 
1961 Vienna Convention of  
Diplomatic Relations24
Pulled out
13. UN Relief  and Works 
Agency
Ended its decades of  
funding
14. NATO Threatened to “go its own 
way” if  other members did 
not spend more on defense
15. WTO 1995 Threatened to pull out and 
blocked the appointment of  
new judges to the appellate 
body
Another area involves various unilateral sanctions 
against multiple national sanctions including Iran, Rus-
22 Due to President Trump’s displeasure with the Korea-US Free 
Trade Agreement (often referred to as KORUS), the US and South 
Korea renegotiated the agreement, which became Trump’s first 
trade deal. KORUS 2.0 is a tweak of  the original KORUS but con-
tains some major changes demanded by the US including steel ex-
port restrictions, a larger quota for U.S. cars exported to Korea that 
meet U.S. emissions and safety standards instead of  Korea’s idiosyn-
cratic rules, an extension of  the duration of  the U.S. 25% tariffs on 
imported pickup trucks, changes to rules on Korean medicine pric-
ing, and new procedures for Korean customs inspections. LESTER, 
Simon; MANAK, Inu; KIM, Kyounghwa. Trump’s first trade deal: 
the slightly revised Korea-US free yrade agreement. CATO Institute, 




24 RAMPTON, Roberta. US withdraws from international ac-










































































































sia, North Korea, Venezuela and China, to achieve U.S. 
specific goals. In January 2017, Trump signed executive 
order: the Travel Ban for 90 days blocked entry into 
the United States by citizens of  seven predominately 
Muslim countries. In September of  the same year, the 
Ban was adjusted to add North Korea and Venezuela, 
and barred individuals with valid visas and green cards 
from those countries from re-entering the United Sta-
tes.25 During the recently concluded U.S.-China Trade 
War, Trump ordered a Special 301 investigation of  Chi-
na in 2018 and put China on the Special 301 “Priority 
Watch List”.26 As a broad regulatory measure, sanc-
tions under Section 301 can include reduction in aids, 
the suspension of  trade concessions, or the creation of  
some import restrictions.27 Section 301 also permits the 
United States to reach behaviors of  Chinese enterprises 
that have little to do with the state’s alleged violative 
practices.28 At the same time, Section 301 also gives the 
government broad power to sanction foreign corpora-
tions. The US Department of  Commerce in May 2019 
issued a Final Rule adding Huawei Technologies Co. Ltd. 
(Huawei) and its 68 non-US affiliates29 to the Bureau of  
Industry and Security (BIS) “Entity List”.30 The Entity 
List, maintained as Supplement No. 4 to Part 744 of  the 
Export Administration Regulation (“EAR”), identifies 
legal and natural persons believed to be involved, or to 
pose a significant risk of  being or becoming involved, in 
activities contrary to the national security or foreign po-
licy interests of  the United States.31 This cut off  Huawei 
25 Protecting the Nation from Foreign Terrorist Entry into the 
United States, 82 Fed. Reg. 8977 (Jan. 27, 2017).
26 RAMPTON, Roberta. US withdraws from international ac-




27 See BELLO, Judith H.; HOLMER, Alan F. Special 301: its re-
quirements, implementation, and significance. Fordham International 
Law Journal, v. 13, n. 259, 1990.
28 See BELLO, Judith H.; HOLMER, Alan F. Special 301: its re-
quirements, implementation, and significance. Fordham International 
Law Journal, v. 13, n. 259, 1990.
29 These non-US affiliates are located in 26 countries.
30 The restrictions were posted by the Department of  Commerce 
on the Federal Register Notice on May 16, 2019. All items in the 
United States are subject to the jurisdiction of  the Department of  
Commerce and EAR, a list of  organizations as identified by BIS as 
engaging activities that could be contrary to the national security 
or foreign policy interests of  the United States are included in the 
BIS list, and United States enterprises are banned from exporting to 
organizations on the Entity List.
31 BIS cited the 13 court indictment against Huawei accusing Hua-
wei of  willfully conducting and concealing millions of  dollars’ worth 
from the supply chain and Huawei would be unable to 
acquire US-origin hardware, software and technology 
directly or indirectly.32 Further, the US government, in 
its zero-sum thinking of  a “race to 5G”,33 has been in 
an intensive outreach campaign trying hard to persuade 
its allies such as the EU, Australia and Japan not to use 
Huawei’s equipment for their own 5G programs though 
the allies largely resisted such proactive efforts.34
As the dominant financial superpower of  the world, 
following September 11th, the United States has made 
concerted efforts to choke off  funding for terrorist or-
ganizations like al Qaeda and ISIS. Similarly, it has used 
denial of  access to the global financing system and eco-
nomic sanctions to aggression by North Korea, Syria, 
Iran and Russia. These series of  economic and financial 
sanctions including asset freezes, import tariffs, trade 
barriers, travel restrictions, import/export ban, and 
embargos, are designed to cause financial damage and 
distress to the sanctioned states, and are largely effecti-
ve.35 The secondary sanction, which refers to regulatory 
efforts preventing foreign corporations from doing bu-
siness with a sanctioned state,36 like the U.S. request for 
the extradition Huawei Technology’s Chief  Financial 
Officer from Canada during the U.S.-China Trade War, 
based on Huawei’s engagement in trade with Iran, has 
been attacked by many for the weakness or even lack of  
of  transactions in violation of  US economic transactions against 
Iran. The indictment accuses certain non-US Huawei affiliates of  
having participated in the alleged criminal conduct.
32 The restrictions affect US subsidiaries of  foreign companies 
which are US persons and US companies’ business with any foreign 
companies that have contracts with Huawei involving information 
or communications technology or services. The US-origin items can 
be located in the US or other places in the world, or exported from 
the US, or any foreign-made item with more than 25% US-origin 
content or 10% US-origin content for countries subject to US sanc-
tions, or any foreign-made item that is the direct product of  certain 
controlled US-origin software, technology, or major plant or equip-
ment located abroad.
33 AMERICA v. China Huawei and 5Geopolitics. The Economist, 
Apr. 11-17, 2020. at 10.
34 WOO, Stu; O’KEEFFE, Kate. Washington asks allies to drop 
Huawei. The Wall Street Journal, Nov. 23, 2018. Available at: htt-
ps://www.wsj.com/articles/washington-asks-allies-to-drop-hua-
wei-1542965105. Access: Mar. 31, 2020.
35 See GURULE, Jimmy. The demise of  the U.N. economic sanc-
tions: regime to deprive terrorists of  funding. Case W. Res. J. Int’L, v. 
41, n. 19, p. 20-28, 2009.
36 CLARK, Harry L. Dealing with U.S. extraterritorial sanctions 
with foreign countermeasures. U. PA. J. International Economics and 
Law, v. 20, n. 61, p. 63-64, 1999. (discussing U.S. efforts to induce 
foreign corporation to abide by U.S. sanctions against third coun-








































































































International legal scholars have been calling for 
a further differentiation between legal and illegal uni-
lateral sanctions. Like Devika Howell argues, due to 
international order’s consent-based nature, sanctions 
should not cross the line from inducing states to do so-
mething it is not bound to do under international law.38 
Customary international law also provides that a state 
has violated an international obligation to another state 
or an obligation to all states as it is subject to certain 
“peaceful retaliatory” measures that would “otherwise 
be illegal”.39 Therefore, unilateral sanctions can become 
problematic when they are associated with one commu-
nity imposing its values on another, where that other 
community has not consented to the imposition of  
such values.40 In many circumstances, the type of  wrong 
being sanctioned is linked to an existing international 
obligation. Under such circumstances, it is more likely 
for the being sanctioned country to remedy their wrong 
by making it in line with its prior international commit-
ments. If  the type of  wrong sanctioned is connected 
only to a bilateral norm, the state being sanctioned is 
less likely to change its behavior unless doing so is in 
its own interest after a cost-benefit analysis.41 However, 
within the United States, there has been such view that 
“within the broad limit of  international law, every coun-
try must retain the authority to impose sanctions to pro-
tect its sovereign security interests.”42 This argument is 
further bolstered by the more widely agreed statement 
that international institutions like the United Nations 
are particularly hard to build up necessary measures to 
support effective sanctions given the rudimentary inter-
37 MALAWER, Stuart S. Pending section 232 litigation and broad-
er trade trends: will the US courts restrict presidential authority from 
relying upon national security?. China & WTO Review, v. 1, n. 183, 
p. 185, 2019.
38 TZANAKOPOULOS, Antonios. The right to be free from eco-
nomic coercion. Cambridge International Law Journal, v. 4, p. 616-617, 
2015.
39 CLEVELAND, Sarah. Norm internalization and economic sanctions. 
55.
40 SANDS, Phillippe. Unilateralism, values and international law. 
EJIL, v. 11, p. 291-293, 2000.
41 ACEVES, Williams J. The economic analysis of  international 
law: transaction cost economics and the concept of  state practice. 
University of  Pennsylvania Journal of  International Economic Law, v. 17, n. 
4, p. 996-1068, 1996; TRACHTMAN, Joel P. Trade and … prob-
lems: cost-benefit analysis and subsidiarity. European Journal of  Inter-
national Law, v. 9, p. 32-85, 1998. (arguing the cost-benefit analysis is 
not applied, and the utility of  trade-off  devices instead).
42 COHEN, David; GOLDMAN, Zachary. Like it or not, unilateral 
sanctions are here to stay. ASIL Unbound, 2019.
national law enforcement mechanism.43
Populism aims to promote national interests and to 
detach from globalization, multilateralism, and free mo-
vement of  goods, services, capital and labour. It threa-
tens global commitments on free trade, climate change, 
energy sustainability, among others, and challenges the 
so-called liberal democratic conceptions relating to the 
rule of  law and international cooperation. The recur-
rent populist “blame game” or hostility towards foreign 
states, international organizations and international law 
overshadows legitimate concerns as regards other states 
and global governance as a whole. While the blame-ga-
me occurs in the global scale, the regional idiosyncrasies 
and the country study may make greater sense.
Many of  the tactics that populist leaders use have 
gained themselves stronger voter support, but weaken 
international legal order, democratic institutions and 
executive power. Unlike his predecessor, a populist lea-
der like Trump does not seem to believe in any form 
of  universal rights. Good at fueling polarization of  the 
society by commitment to name calling on social me-
dia, disinformation and “fake news”, these leaders of  
Western democracies show little differences with their 
counterparts in totalitarian or authoritarian regimes. As 
societies grow more polarized, people become willing 
to tolerate abuses of  power and sacrifice democratic 
principles, which together increases the risk of  broken 
down of  any form of  existing international order.
3  Populism and Disengagement of 
International Mechanisms
The current global economic governance was essen-
tially shaped by the states’ surrender of  sovereignty to 
international institutions and global governance system 
after the World War II with the common ground of  
achieving peace, stability and prosperity.
Contemporary populist regimes are tainted by a vul-
garized version of  neoconservative ideology, encom-
passing anti-environmentalism, ethno-nationalism and 
primitive sovereigntism. With the re-emergence of  po-
pulism, popular sovereignty has resurfaced as a political 
category, calling into question understandings of  globa-
43 COHEN, David; GOLDMAN, Zachary. Like it or not, unilateral 







































































































lization and international cooperation.
One of  the targets of  populist ideology and popu-
list political action has been the judicialization of  in-
ternational economic law in globalization, accusing of  
semi-judicial elitism in investor-state dispute settlement 
mechanism criticizing the elite arbitration circle and its 
detachment from the host states, their people and the 
democratic systems. The critique concerns the ISDS’s 
tendency towards creating government des judges and 
the anti-demoliberal status quo ante.
The ICSID arbitration regime based on the ICSID 
Convention is a vital component for maintaining the ope-
ration of  the modern international investment law re-
gime. The mode of  resolving investment disputes by 
urging the host state to transfer and delegate part of  its 
judicial sovereignty is the central aspect and powerful 
illustration of  the “leaving” of  the states in the field of  
international investment law.
The legal norms in favor of  foreign investment pro-
tection advanced by the ICSID encountered some de-
fects resulting from a series of  controversial cases. The-
se defects showcase how the regulatory space of  states 
were overlooked, affected and even diminished by arbi-
tral practices in the ICSID proceedings, and more im-
portantly, how democratic or public choices available to 
the host state government were compromised by these 
arbitration cases.
The application of  the host state’s law in ICSID ar-
bitration depends entirely on the interpretation of  the 
arbitration tribunals. More often, arbitration tribunals 
prefer to apply an expansive approach to interpreting 
vaguely defined substantive terms in the BITs. By doing 
so, the host state’s sovereign acts are reviewed by a tri-
bunal against standards that do not have definite con-
tent.44 The ICSID arbitration tribunal has also defined 
its position of  restricting the application of  the host 
state’s law in real practice.
The main methods adopted are as follows. First, 
international law is used to exclude the application of  
the host state’s domestic law. In the case of  Wena Ho-
tels v. Egypt, the arbitration tribunal once pointed out 
that the ICSID Convention does not limit the scope 
of  application of  the host state’s law and international 
law (including BITs) so that the arbitration tribunal is 
44 SORNARAJAH, M. The international law on foreign investment. 2. 
ed. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004. p. 233.
entitled to decide on the specific applicable law.45 In 
the case of  ADC Affiliate v. Hungary, facing the BIT’s 
explicit agreement to apply the host state’s law to the 
calculation of  compensation for expropriation, the ar-
bitration tribunal directly excluded the application of  
the host state’s law to other disputed matters, emphasi-
zing its position that international law shall be applied 
preferentially except for special agreements in the BIT.46 
Second, the influence of  the host state’s law is diluted 
by its combination with international law. In the case 
of  Antoine v. Burundi, the arbitration tribunal recog-
nized that excessive restrictions on the host state’s law 
will lead to an imbalance of  interests in the investment 
arbitration regime.47 Therefore, when settling disputes, 
the host state’s law and international law are often com-
bined to be used to deal with the cases. In this process, 
in applying the host state’s law at the parties’ choice, 
the arbitration tribunal emphasized the supplementary, 
corrective and even restrictive function of  international 
law.48 In other words, it is a tendentious application and 
a pragmatic way of  dissolving the host state’s law by in-
ternational law in an attempt to prioritize international 
law in ICSID arbitration over the host state’s domestic 
law. This tendency to exclude and restrict the applica-
tion of  the host state’s law has occurred frequently in 
the ICSID arbitration practices in recent years. In the 
case of  Kim and others v. Uzbekistan, when the host sta-
te interpreted the BIT in accordance with the Vienna 
Convention on the Law of  Treaties to prove that when 
investors violate the laws of  that state and raised objec-
tions to jurisdiction, the arbitration tribunal, while de-
monstrating the applicability of  the Vienna Convention 
on the Law of  Treaties,49 still rejected the host state’s 
45 Wena Hotels Ltd. v. Arab Republic of  Egypt, ICSID Case No. 
ARB/98/4, Ad Hoc Committee Decision on Application for An-
nulment, 2002, ICSID Report, v. 6, p. 933, 2004.
46 ADC Affiliate Limited and ADC & ADMC Management Limited 
v. The Republic of  Hungary, ICSID Case No.ARB/03/16, Award, p. 
288-293, 2006.
47 See Antoine Goetz and others v. Republic of  Burundi, ICSID Case No. 
ARB/95/3, Award, p. 98, 1999.
48 See HONGRUI, Chen. The application of  host state’s law in 
international investment arbitration: the acceptability of  article 30 
of  US model BIT. Journal of  International Economic Law, Chen An ed., 
University Press, p. 162-167, 2010. (Chen Hongrui: Lun Dong Dao 
Guo Fa Lv Zai Guo Ji Tou Zi Zhong Cai Zhong De Shi Yong——
Jian Ping 2004 Nian Mei Guo BIT Fan Ben Di 30 Tiao De Ke Jie 
Shou Xing, Chen An Zhu Bian: Guo Ji Jing Ji Fa Xue Kan, v. 17, n. 
4, Beijing: Bei Jing Da Xue Chu Ban She, p. 162-167, 2010.)
49 The Vienna Convention on the Law of  Treaties, adopted and 
opened for signature on 23 May 1969, entered into force 27 January 







































































































defense on the vague ground that investors had con-
ducted investment activities in accordance with the host 
state’s law and did not seriously damage the interests 
of  the host state, deliberately avoiding the application 
of  the host state’s law.50 Although Philippe Sands, the 
arbitrator in this case, held in a dissenting opinion that 
the host state’s law should be considered and applied 
in combination with relevant international laws51 based 
on the opinions of  the arbitration tribunal in the case 
of  Urbaser v. Argentina,52 this view was not supported 
or adopted by other arbitrators finally. In the case of  
Bear Creek Mining v. Peru, the host state proposed that 
the host state’s local law should be treated differently 
from international law. However, the arbitration tribu-
nal rejected this view.53 Therefore, in ICSID arbitration, 
even if  the ICSID Convention and BITs both stipulate 
that the host state’s law can be applied, the arbitration 
tribunal often evades the application of  the host state’s 
law. Even if  the host state’s law has to be applied, other 
methods have often been employed to control the in-
fluence of  the host state’s law to a minimum level.
Apart from the application of  the host state’s law in 
ICSID arbitration, relevant cases also show an ICSID 
arbitration tribunal’s inclination towards investors in the 
interpretation and application of  umbrella clauses and 
most-favored-nation treatment clauses.54 Investment 
arbitration tribunals’ expansive but conflicting interpre-
tations have technically turned substantive standards in 
the BITs such as the fair and equitable treatment stan-
dard to grey ones which made the sovereignty of  host 
states more vulnerable while potentially creating a safer 
investment environment for foreign investors. The dis-
crepancies between varying interpretative approaches 
have turned into sheer chaos,55 which has been labe-
Kazakhstan on 5 January 1994 and by Uzbekistan on 12 July 1995.
50 Pavel Borissov, Aibar Burkitbayev, Almas Chukin and others v. Republic 
of  Uzbekistan, ICSID Case No. ARB/13/6, Decision on Jurisdiction, 
para. 413, 541, 2017.
51 See Pavel Borissov, Aibar Burkitbayev, Almas Chukin and others v. Re-
public of  Uzbekistan, ICSID Case No.ARB/13/6, Partial Dissenting 
Opinion Professor Philippe Sands QC, para. 10 2017.
52 See Urbaser S.A. and Consorcio de Aguas Bilbao Bizkaia, Bil-
bao Biskaia Ur Partuergoa v. The Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. 
ARB/07/26, Award, para. 1199, 2016.
53 See Bear Creek Mining Corporation v. Republic of  Peru, ICSID Case 
No. ARB/14/21, Award, p. 267-269, 2017.
54 See EGLI, Gabriel. Don’t get bit: addressing ICSID’s inconsist-
ent application of  most-favored-nation clauses to dispute resolution 
provisions. Pepperdine Law Review, v. 34, p. 1045-1084, 2007.
55 MANCIAUX, Sébastien. The notion of  investment: new con-
troversies. Journal World Investment and Trade, v. 9, p. 443-444, 2008.
led as a legitimacy crisis of  the ISDS system, calling for 
taking an urgent and effective measure to end the pos-
sible manipulation of  these substantive standards offe-
ring stability and predictability conducive to the host 
state’s regulation over health, environment and other 
economic, regulatory and social issues.56
As a result of  the vagueness of  substantive terms 
in a large number of  BITs, the inconsistent interpre-
tative techniques applied by a large number of  arbitra-
tion tribunals probably with the pre-set objective of  
offering better rights protection to foreign investors as 
well as the lack of  independence of  ISDS owing to a 
close-knit community of  party-appointed internatio-
nal arbitrators,57 the ISDS system left varying negative 
impressions to the users and commentators. Some ca-
ses may have indicated a tendency that investors from 
wealthy states were equipped with more power over the 
governments of  less wealthy host states while other ca-
ses may have justified the existence and utility of  ISDS 
as a tool of  protecting foreign investors from opportu-
nistic actions like expropriations in host states without 
strong rule of  law and legal institutions. Consequently, 
both accusations may be in existence simultaneously – 
weak or poor host states are fighting large multinational 
companies while private entities are fighting arbitrary 
actions taken by developing states. Increasing public 
disapproval has shaken the public confidence over the 
ISDS and caused public outcry.
It is precisely the excessive investor protection in 
ICSID arbitration that causes more states’ dissatisfac-
tion with this regime. In light of  relevant statistics, over 
the past 30 years, Latin American states, represented by 
Argentina and Bolivia, have been among the top res-
pondent states in ICSID arbitration cases. The large-
-amount of  compensation arising from investment 
arbitration cases became a vital factor affecting these 
countries’ economic development. Since 2007, Bolivia, 
Ecuador, Venezuela, and other states have announced 
their decisions to withdraw from the ICSID Convention. 
Argentina was to reconsider its participation in the re-
gime because more than 60 arbitration cases have dra-
gged down its economic development.58
56 ACHAVAL, Clara Picasso. Tipping the balance towards inves-
tors. Journal World Investment and Trade, v. 9, p. 147-162, 2008.
57 KARAMANIAN, Susan. International decision, Compania de 
Aguas del Aconquija S.A. & Vivendi Universal S.A. v Argentine Re-
public. American Journal of  International Law, v. 105, p. 553-555, 2011.







































































































There has been a domino effect in Latin America. 
After having entered 23 BITs, Bolivia denounced the 
ICSID Convention in 2007. After the new Constitution 
of  Bolivia was enacted, the government announced its 
plan to denounce and renegotiate the existing BITs as 
they were deemed to be contrary to the new Constitu-
tion. Ecuador’s denunciation was notified in July 2009 
and came into effect in January 2010.59
Venezuela announced its withdrawal in late January 
2012 which became effective in July 2012. The Foreign 
Ministry’s 2012 press-release points out that the coun-
try acceded to the ICSID Convention in 1993 by “a deci-
sion of  a provisional and weak government, devoid of  
popular legitimacy, and under the pressure of  transna-
tional economic sectors involved in the dismantling of  
Venezuela’s national sovereignty.”60
The decision to withdraw from the ICSID Convention 
matches the then Chavez government’s economic pro-
gram seeking to re-establish the role of  the state in the 
economy and re-control the so-called strategic sectors 
including petroleum, steel, agribusiness, construction, 
telecommunications and banking which were farmed 
out to foreign investors in the 1990s. Although the 
claw-back policies entail foreign investors’ grievances 
against the government and consequently the investor-
-state investment disputes which were submitted to the 
ICSID, they allow Venezuela to walk out of  its com-
mitment under the ICSID Convention to pay “full” com-
pensation to grieved foreign investors, which makes any 
major social or economic program impossible.61 Vene-
zuela is the second only to Argentina and has 20 cases 
pending against it at the ICSID, facing the prospect of  
having to pay billions to successful claimants.62 These 
filed cases are not affected by Venezuela’s denunciation 
and enforcement of  ICSID Awards in Argentina. University of  Penn-
sylvania Journal of  International Economic Law, v. 28, p. 449-483, 2007.
59 FIEZZONI, Silvia Karina. The challenge of  UNASUR mem-
ber countries to replace ICSID arbitration. Beijing Law Review, v. 2, 
p. 134-136, 2011.
60 Gobierno Bolivariano denuncia convenio con Ciadi. 25 Jan. 2012. Avail-
able at: http://www.cadtm.org/Gobierno-Bolivariano-denuncia. 
Access: Feb. 12, 2019.
61 BROWNLIE, Ian. Principles of  public international law. 6. ed. Ox-
ford: Clarendon Press, 2003. p. 513; PAASIVIRTA, E. Participation of  
states in international contracts and arbitral settlement of  disputes. Helsinki: 
Finnish Lawyers’ Publishing Company, 1990. p. 265.
62 This number includes 16 ICSID arbitrations proper and 4 arbi-
trations under the ICSID Additional Facility Rules. See http://icsid.
worldbank.org. According to UNCTAD’s information, there are no 
(publicly known) IIA-based claims pending against Venezuela in 
other international fora.
of  the ICSID Convention.63 Venezuela’s discontent with 
the ICSID has universal significance in light of  the ge-
neral trend towards increasing state intervention in the 
economy64 especially in these countries with a regime 
change.65
The increasing importance of  Latin American states 
before ICSID proceedings, and, more importantly, the 
unfavorable decisions rendered towards them, proba-
bly justifies the denunciation of  the ICSID Convention by 
these countries and explains the regional discussions to 
have an alternative regional framework to deal with the 
ISDS system under the auspices of  the World Bank.66 
As of  May 2013, Latin American countries were parties 
in 81 out of  262 cases concluded (approximately 31%). 
Of  the 167 cases still pending, 73 of  them were against 
Latin American countries (approximately 44%).67 Ar-
gentina alone had 25 cases before ICSID of  the 167 
pending cases passed a draft bill dated March 21, 2012, 
and indicated its plan to exit.68 Since 2001 when the Ar-
gentine economy collapsed, Argentina has faced 43 clai-
ms that amount to approximately US$65 billion in da-
mages. The ICSID has awarded claimants over US$400 
63 Theoretically, disgruntled foreign investors will be able to initi-
ate new cases during the six months between the notice of  denun-
ciation and the date when it becomes effective on July 25, 2012.
64 See UNCTAD. World Investment Report 2011. p. 9  et seq.
65 EL-KADY, H. Egypt’s bilateral investment treaties: a straitjacket in a 
new era of  foreign investment re-regulations?. Dec. 12, 2011. Avail-
able at: https://www.transnational-dispute-management.com/Arti-
cle asp?key=1826#citation. Access: Jan. 29, 2019.
66 In the first 100 cases of  ICSID, Latin American countries were 
concerned by 25 cases (8 cases for Argentina, 7 for Mexico, 3 in 
Venezuela and other countries with one). But in recent years, “IC-
SID has witnessed a dramatic increase in the number of  arbitra-
tions where Latin American countries are respondents”. GOMEZ, 
Katia Fach. Latin America and ICSID: David versus Goliath. Law 
and Business Review of  the Americas, v. 195, p. 195, 2011. For a total 
of  262 cases (indicated at ICSID website), Latin American coun-
tries are concerned by 81 cases (let say 30,9% of  concluded cases): 
Argentina 25 cases, Mexico 13, Ecuador 10, Venezuela 11, Peru 6, 
Costa Rica 5, Bolivia, Chile and Honduras with 2 cases each, and 
El Salvador, Guatemala, Panama and Paraguay with one case each. 
There are 167 pending cases as of  May 30, 2013, and the number of  
cases concerning Latin American Sates is 73, (let say 43.7% of  the 
total number of  pending cases): Argentina with 25 cases, Venezuela 
with 25, Peru 6, Ecuador and Guatemala with 3 each, Bolivia, Costa 
Rica and El Salvador and Paraguay with 2, Chile, Honduras, and 
Uruguay with one each.
67 BEOGLIN, Nicolas. ICSID and Latin America: criticisms, with-
drawals and regional alternatives. Comm for the Abolition of  Third 
World Debt, Jul. 4, 2013.
68 Bill of  Argentina Congress dates April 21, 2012. Text of  the 









































































































million.69 Many states of  the American hemisphere re-
main distant from the ICSID – Canada, Cuba, Mexico 
and Dominican Republic have not ratified the ICSID 
Convention. Costa Rica signed the ICSID Convention in 
1982 but ratified it 12 years later.
Withdrawals from ICSID by Bolivia, Ecuador, Ve-
nezuela and Argentina, and their termination of  BITs70 
are not only a radical expression of  these countries’ dis-
satisfaction with the ICSID Convention-centered regi-
me but also a dramatic portrayal of  a broader trend to 
revisit key aspects of  international investment law. The 
exit from the ICSID Convention and the global forum 
for the settlement of  investment disputes signals the-
se countries’ loss of  faith in the ISDS system. Althou-
gh the withdrawal from the ICSID Convention does not 
entirely block the future international investment arbi-
tration against these countries, denouncing the ICSID 
Convention does send a political message to show their 
refusal for future cooperation in the ICSID-centered re-
gime, and more realistically, the lack of  likelihood of  the 
collection of  damages to be ordered by ICSID tribunals 
against these countries.
Some scholars therefore pointed out that the Calvo 
Doctrine, which was once popular in Latin American 
states, has not died out and is possible to revive and 
resist in a mildly radical way.71 In this sense, the Calvo 
Doctrine still has value in contemporary international 
law even though the ICSID is said to be a superior so-
lution to the Calvo Doctrine.72 While the ICSID in its 
operation indicated its mechanical or even institutional 
defects as an arbitration machinery and an instrument 
of  international public policy,73 the Calvo Doctrine has 
emerged as a vital institutional source and theoretical 
basis for the “return” of  developing states in the field 
of  international investment.
Apart from the revival of  the Calvo Doctrine and 
the withdrawal of  many Latin American states from the 
ICSID regime, emerging economies as non-parties to 
69 Come and Get Me, Economist, Feb. 18, 2012.
70 In 2008, Ecuador terminated nine BITs – with Cuba, the Do-
minican Republic, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, 
Paraguay, Romania and Uruguay.
71 SHAN, Wenhua. Is Calvo dead?. American Journal of  Comparative 
Law, v. 55, p. 123-163, 2007.
72 See SHIHATA, Ibrahim F. I. Towards a greater depoliticization 
of  investment disputes: the roles of  ICSID and MIGA. ICSID Re-
view-Foreign Investment Law Journal, v. 1, n. 1, p. 24-25, 1986.
73 ICSID, Annual Report (1984) 5.
ICSID such as India, Brazil and South Africa,74 which 
have become increasingly crucial in the field of  interna-
tional investment in recent years,75 also restrict or even 
exclude the use of  the ISDS regime by updating their 
model BITs and amending their domestic laws. The de-
cline or rise of  the Calvo Doctrine suggests the leaving 
or return of  the state when it comes to settling its dis-
putes with foreign investors. The changing role of  the 
Calvo Doctrine indicates the uncertainty of  its applica-
tion which is likely related to the host state’s view over 
sovereignty. Nevertheless, the principle of  diplomatic 
protection remains part of  the realities of  international 
life.76
For example, India’s model BIT published in 2016 
contains full restrictions on the ISDS mechanism. On 
the one hand, the model BIT highly emphasizes the lo-
cal remedies such as administrative and judicial tribu-
nals foreign investors have to rely on in resolving invest-
ment disputes with the Indian government after their 
rights are damaged.77 Meanwhile, India believes that the 
international arbitration tribunal has no right to review 
the judicial decisions of  sovereign states, thus denying 
international agencies right to review the decisions of  
their own courts.78 Although the model BIT allows IC-
SID to intervene in disputes “on the premise that both 
parties are members of  ICSID”,79 the fact that India is 
not a member of  ICSID and has no intention to join 
the ICSID in the years to come makes this provision 
meaningless.
For another example, Brazil signed a number of  
BITs as early as the 1990s. However, its congress did 
not approve these BITs in order to safeguard its right 
74 By the end of  January 2019, India, Brazil and South Africa had 
not joined ICSID. See ICSID, Available at: https://icsid.worldbank.
org/en/Pages/about/Member-States.aspx. Access: Jan. 31, 2019.
75 According to World Investment Report 2018, India and Brazil 
have long been at the forefront of  capital outflows and inflows in 
the world, and South Africa, as a regional investment power, has 
always been affecting Africa’s investment outflows and inflows. See 
UNCTAD. World Investment Report 2018. Jun. 6, 2018. p. 4-6. Availa-
ble at: https://unctad.org/en/PublicationsLibrary/wir2018_en.pdf. 
Access: Nov. 12, 2018.
76 SHIHATA, Ibrahim F. I. Towards a greater depoliticization of  
investment disputes: the roles of  ICSID and MIGA. ICSID Review-
Foreign Investment Law Journal, v. 1, n. 1, p. 24-25, 1986.
77 2016 Model Text for the Indian Bilateral Investment Treaty, Ar-
ticles 15.1, 15.2, 15.4, 15.5.
78 2016 Model Text for the Indian Bilateral Investment Treaty, at 
Article 13.5.








































































































to regulate foreign capital. Brazil showed no interest in 
ratifying the ICSID or any BIT despite having signed 
some BITs and even though Brazil named the ICSID 
Secretary-General the “appointing authority” of  arbi-
trators in some guarantee agreements executed by Bra-
zil in favor of  foreign lenders to Brazilian public enti-
ties.80 Since the new century, Brazil has also been having 
a Cooperation and Investment Facilitation Agreements 
(CIFA) regime for its own interests in the ICSID regi-
me, continuing its consistent position of  safeguarding 
its right to regulate foreign capital and restricting fo-
reign investors’ right to sue. Therefore, some scholars 
believe that Brazil’s investment dispute settlement me-
chanism tends to return to the international customary 
law of  diplomatic protection.81 Take one example. The 
Bilateral Investment Agreement between India and Bra-
zil does not use investor-state arbitration but requires an 
ombudsman to conduct state-to-state arbitration.82
In the meantime, South Africa has also conducted in 
recent years a large number of  reviews over those BITs 
signed in the last century and found that quite a num-
ber of  treaties are inconsistent with its own investment 
policies and constitution.83 Therefore, after 2010, South 
Africa terminated BITs with Germany, Switzerland, the 
Netherlands and other states respectively, and explicitly 
excluded ISDS in the Investment Protection Act pro-
mulgated in 2015,84 further strengthening its right to 
regulate foreign capital, in a bid to protect South Africa 
from the legal risks of  being sued by foreign investors 
for investment disputes.
South Africa has decided to modernize its investment 
protection regime in a manner that balances strong pro-
tection for investors with Constitutional requirements 
to safeguard the public interest and promote sustainable 
development and inclusive growth. This has involved 
developing a new investment bill that would strengthen 
80 DELAUME, Feorges R. ICSID and the Banker. International Fi-
nancial Law Review, v. 2, n. 9, p. 13, 1983.
81 ROLLAND, Sonia E. The return of  state remedies in investor-
state dispute settlement: trends in developing countries. Loyola Uni-
versity Chicago Law Journal, v. 49, n. 387, p. 395-399, 2017.
82 See BHAT, Rohit. Will India do away with investor state arbitration?. 
Aug. 23, 2017. Available at: http://arbitrationblog.kluwerarbitration.
com/2017/08/23/will-india-away-investor-state-arbitration/. Ac-
cess: Jan. 30, 2019.
83 See LANG, Jonathan; GILFILLAN, Bowman. Bilateral investment 
treaties: a shield or a sword?. Nov. 8, 2013. p. 2-3. Available at: http://
www.bowmanslaw.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/09/PPI-arti-
cle_mailshot_08112013_1038389_1-1.pdf. Access: Jan. 9, 2019.
84 Protection of  Investment Act (Act No. 22/2015) (S. Aft.).
and clarify protection provided to all investors in South 
Africa as well as terminating BITs that pose unaccepta-
ble risks to democratic policy making in South Africa, 
without delivering any discernible economic benefit.
The South Africa government in 2012 decided to 
unilaterally terminate BITs with some EU member sta-
tes such as Belgium and Luxembourg, Spain, Germany, 
Switzerland, and the Netherlands. It seeks to sign new 
investment protection agreements with these states on 
the basis of  local laws. Abandoning BITs can negate 
South Africa’s potential international obligations over 
public policies designed for social redress. The gover-
nment replaced these BITs with the Promotion and 
Protection of  Investment Act 2015, which is rooted in 
South Africa’s Constitution and gives more policy spa-
ce to the government and an apparent advantage over 
the restrictive and outdated BITs. The driving force 
of  this overhaul is the likelihood of  the government 
being brought before the international court of  arbitra-
tion over some controversial public policies such as the 
Broad-based Black Economic Empowerment and land 
redistribution policies.
The EU views such a move as hostile and symp-
tomatic of  “emerging protectionism” in South Africa, 
which however argues that the Constitution is the su-
preme law of  the law and is sufficient to offer protec-
tion to foreign investors. The host state government 
can either screen foreign investment by relying on a na-
tional security review or designate some sectors of  the 
economy as strategic so as to keep them off-limits to 
foreign investors.
More countries have been and are in the process of  
reviewing their model BITs and renegotiating existing 
BITs for the purpose of  striking a new balance between 
foreign investors and home states.
Latin American countries had a strong tradition of  
keeping a distance from the World Bank and the ICSID 
in the 1960s and 1970s when almost all of  these coun-
tries voted against the idea of  having the ICSID.85 Ter-
85 Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Repub-
lic Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Haiti, 
Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay 
and Venezuela. ICSID, History of  the ICSID Convention. Documents 
Concerning the Origin and the Formulation of  the Convention on 
the Settlement of  Investment Disputes between States and Nation-
als of  Other States, Washington DC, ICSID, Vol. II-1, p. 606-608. 
See also English studies using “No-de-Tokyo” Spanish expression: 







































































































minating BITs itself  is an exercise of  a host state’s so-
vereign power. On March 11, 2011, Bolivia, Colombia, 
Ecuador, Peru, Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, Uruguay, 
Chile, Guyana, Suriname, and Venezuela formed the 
Union of  South American Nations (UNASUR), one of  
whose future goals is to establish an international in-
vestment arbitration forum that recognizes the distinct 
nature of  these emerging economies.86 The proposed 
framework includes various Latin America-favored 
components such as hearings being held in an official 
South American language, the forum being used after 
the exhaustion of  local remedies, transparency with 
documents and hearings being made available, and an 
appeal system.87
Although the ISDS is a non-majoritarian institution 
in international law, the majoritarian difficulty is clear 
while rule of  law is backsliding and global rule of  law 
is decaying. The concept of  legitimacy is broadly used 
in today’s discourse about populism in order to suggest 
that certain institutions set up by populists or subject to 
their hostile takeover have become illegitimate. The no-
tion of  legitimacy has been under attack in international 
investment law even though legitimacy has been largely 
achieved through the investor-state dispute settlement 
mechanism by reference to social justice and progressi-
ve policies in general.
The dimensions of  legal political have changed. A 
new conflict between nationalist and socially conserva-
tive versus cosmopolitan and socially progressive posi-
tions has emerged. Populist governments, representing 
populist people (and their true interests at large) and 
positioning themselves on the new dimension of  legal 
conflict, campaign on anti-establishment. Populist ideo-
logy is a reaction to economic distress which is systemi-
cally correlated with economic insecurity and adverse 
trade shocks.
ICSID in Latin America. Dec. 19, 2009. Available at: http://works.
bepress.com/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1000&context=ignaci
o_vincentelli. Access: Jan. 5, 2019.
86 GOMEZ, Katia Fach. Latin American approach to international 
dispute resolution. American Society of  International Law Meet-
ing in Washington. Mar. 25, 2011. Available at: http://www.
academia,edu/830249/latin_American_Approaches-to_Interna-
tional_Dispute_Resolution. Access: Jan. 9, 2019.
87 GOMEZ, Katia Fach. Latin American approach to international 
dispute resolution. American Society of  International Law Meet-
ing in Washington. Mar. 25, 2011. Available at: http://www.
academia,edu/830249/latin_American_Approaches-to_Interna-
tional_Dispute_Resolution. Access: Jan. 9, 2019.
In the past, economic adversity triggered a demand 
for protection through the welfare state, which bene-
fited social democratic parties and reinforced the tra-
de unions. Now adverse economic shocks push voters 
towards socially conservative politicians that campaign 
on platforms of  welfare state retrenchment and are not 
paladins of  redistributive economic policies. In the ab-
sence of  other political options, the losers from globa-
lization and technological advances turned towards the 
new populist parties.
4 State Is Back!
Populism is often packaged in the form of  natio-
nalism. Therefore, the other indirect consequence of  
the rise of  populism is the change in power balance of  
multinational corporations, which used to be the most 
important private actors in transnational legal gover-
nance. State-owned enterprises (SOEs) and sovereign-
ty wealth funds (SWFs) have now emerged to be the 
new dominant actors in the Global South to enable or 
perpetuate relationships between international law and 
authoritarianism.
Sovereignty is an issue of  international law that 
constantly deserves revisits. International law has long 
struggled with the problem of  how makers of  interna-
tional law can also be bound by it.88 International law as 
a concept rests on the traditional notion of  states which 
are arisen from the Westphalian system. As the nature 
of  sovereignty and its relationship with law evolves, the 
foundation of  the sovereignty concept also changes. For 
example, the emergence of  international human rights 
law has challenged the classical conceptualization of  
sovereignty, which asserts that a sovereign government 
has absolute legal authority within its territory over its 
citizens.89 The recent intensification of  globalization 
has further challenged international law which governs 
relations among sovereign states and private actors. The 
increasing popularity of  international investment arbi-
tration cases, which are essentially claims initiated by 
commercial actors against state governments, has also 
88 E.g., SCOTT, Shirley V. International law in world politics: an intro-
duction. London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2010. p. 19-27; ANG-
HIE, Antony. Rethinking sovereignty in international law. Annual 
Review of  Law and Social Science, v. 5, p. 291, 2009.
89 POSNER, Eric A. The perils of  global legalism. Chicago; London: 







































































































distorted the power relationship between sovereignty 
and private commercial entities which frequently parti-
cipate in international commerce based on the triumph 
of  the “free market” concept. International law has not 
been a closed legal system containing a fixed tally of  
actors on the international scene.90 Instead, increasing 
participation of  new international actors in internatio-
nal commerce, for example, multinational corporations, 
sovereign wealth funds, international organizations, 
and non-profit entities, most of  them being termed 
controversial candidatures,91 have changed the picture 
of  global economic governance and international legal 
system92 which in the past was mostly dominated by 
sovereignty actors.93 New issues in state responsibilities 
also constantly arise after the occurrence of  large-scale 
financial crises in regions like East Asia, Latin America 
and the Middle East.94
However, some most important debates concer-
ning the changing concept of  sovereignty are raised 
after the 2008-2009 financial crisis, which caused a dra-
matic increase in state economic intervention both by 
the developed and developing nations. This so called 
phenomenon of  return of  “state capitalism” has been 
accompanied by the remarkable comeback of  public 
wealth, public investment and public enterprises.95 State 
government starts to interfere more deeply with private 
economic activities by nationalizing private industries 
and creating more state owned investment entities.96 For 
example, in 2010 the United Kingdom, which has tra-
90 BROWNLIE, Ian. Principles of  public international law. 5. ed. Ox-
ford: Clarendon Press, 1998. p. 66-67.
91 BROWNLIE, Ian. Principles of  public international law. 5. ed. Ox-
ford: Clarendon Press, 1998. p. 66-67.
92 In other international law arenas, the emergence of  new actors 
such as private military and security companies has created new 
challenges for international humanitarian law. THÜRER, Daniel. 
International humanitarian law: theory, practice, context. Hague: Hague 
Academy of  International Law, 2011. p. 252.
93 HIGGNS, Rosalyn. Problems and process: international law and 
how we use it. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994. p. 39.
94 E.g., in a number of  cases American investors filed against Ar-
gentina on claims arisen from breaches of  US-Argentina BIT in-
cluding CMS Gas Transmission Company v. Argentina Republic (Merits) 
(12 May 2005), 44 ILM 1205, state responsibility under international 
law to ensure a stable and predictable environment for foreign in-
vestors in the midst of  financial downturn was repeatedly raised as 
an issue.
95 BREMMER, Ian. The return of  State capitalism. Survival: Glob-
al Politics and Strategy, v. 50, n. 3, p. 55, 2008.
96 MCNAMARA, Tom. Foreign sovereign immunity during the 
new nationalisation wave. Business Law International, v. 11, n. 1, p. 
5-38, 2010.
ditionally embraced liberalist economic principles, took 
up major shares of  its two global financial institutions, 
the Lloyds Banking Group and Royal Bank of  Scotland, 
during this movement toward nationalization.
State-directed capitalism is not a new phenomenon, 
and the colonial era witnessed State Owned Enterprises 
(SOE) such as East India Company’s overseas expan-
sion. In some of  the world’s major economies, inclu-
ding China and Russia today, state-backed companies 
have accounted for more than 2/3 of  these countries’ 
stock market value.97 As this new wave of  state capita-
lism took place in various forms, the recent rise of  Sove-
reign Wealth Funds (SWFs), a transnational investment 
vehicle of  states that are distinguishable from traditio-
nal state controlled investment vehicles, deserves some 
attention.98 Some developing states, flush with money 
as a result of  flows of  profits resulting from econo-
mic globalization such as imbalances of  global trading 
and capital flows, have created funds for making invest-
ments in developed or developing countries with their 
surplus capital. These states include smaller city states 
like Singapore whose SWFs survive on large amount 
of  foreign reserves, Dubai whose SWFs mainly come 
from the country’s oil revenues, and Uganda that has 
attracted huge volume of  international donation,99 but 
apparently, the most dramatic rise was that associated 
with China. This seems to recall the importance of  an 
old principle, demonstrating the possibility of  a state’s 
dual role as simultaneously sovereign and “corporate”, 
depending on the nature of  its action.
The first SWF was established in Kuwait and named 
Kuwait Investment Authority in the year of  1953. It 
remains one of  the largest SWFs based on an estima-
te of  its overall assets. There is no uniform definition 
for SWF. The IMF made an attempt to distinguish the 
SWF on its functions and objectives by defining SWF 
as “special purpose investment funds or arrangements 
owned by the general government”100 while the World 
97 THE RISE of  State capitalism. The Economist, 21 Jan. 2012. 
Available at: http://www.economist.com/node/21543160.
98 E.g., “SOEs as Driving Force”, in WOLFF, Lutz-Christian (ed.). 
China outbound investments: a guide to law and practice. Hong Kong: 
CCH Hong Kong Limited, 2011. p. 4.
99 For a description of  different resources of  SWF assets, see BA-
LIN, Bryan J. Sovereign wealth funds: a critical analysis. Johns Hop-
kins University School of  Advanced International Studies, 2009. 
Available at: http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_
id=1477725.
100 International Working Group of  Sovereign Wealth Funds 







































































































Bank suggested them to be “long term investment fun-
ds typical for both income and intergenerational weal-
th transfer.”101 On the other hand, although SOEs and 
SWFs both invested in economic markets abroad, SOEs 
like to seek controlling interests in investment target by 
the way of  acquisition of  control of  a private economic 
entity, the investment purposes of  SWFs apparently are 
more diverse.102 For example, some works specify that 
the pool of  money of  SWF must be managed by a go-
vernment sovereign entity in the sense that it has fo-
reign currency exposure, without explicit liabilities, and 
must have a high risk tolerance, or a long investment 
horizon.103
Today, the role and scale of  SWFs in cross border 
investment activities have become more visible. So 
do sovereign nations in the scale of  their penetration 
into the global financial market. Through a group of  
SWFs, sovereign owners are more capable of  mobili-
zing their economic resources and coordinating econo-
mic activities to achieve economic and sovereign goals. 
According to an IMF estimate, the overall assets held 
by SWFs was only about US$0.5 billion in the early 
2000s, and have grown very rapidly in the last 10-15 
years. SWFs now manage US$7 trillion assets.104 Althou-
gh most SWFs choose to behave quite low key in their 
investment patterns, they have started to gain more at-
tention after some of  the largest transactions involving 
SWFs from developing nations appeared in the Western 
media. The controversial investment of  CNOOC105 and 
‘Santiago Principles’. 2008.; GAUKRODGER, David. Foreign state im-
munity and foreign government controlled investors. OECD Working Papers 
on International Investment, 2010. Available at: https://www.oecd.
org/corporate/mne/WP-2010_2.pdf.
101 MITCHELL, Olivia S.; PIGGOTT, John; KUMRU, Cagri. 
Managing public investment funds: best practices and new chal-
lenges. National Bureau of  Economic Research Working Paper No. 14078, 
2008. Available at: https://www.business.unsw.edu.au/research-
site/australianinstituteforpopulationageingresearch-site/Docu-
ments.
102 MITCHELL, Olivia S.; PIGGOTT, John; KUMRU, Cagri. 
Managing public investment funds: best practices and new chal-
lenges. National Bureau of  Economic Research Working Paper No. 14078, 
2008. Available at: https://www.business.unsw.edu.au/research-
site/australianinstituteforpopulationageingresearch-site/Docu-
ments.
103 JEN, Stephen. Sovereign wealth funds: what they are and what’s 
happening. World Economics, v. 8, n. 1, p. 1-2, 2007.
104 Sovereign Wealth Fund Institute. Fund rankings. 2014. Available 
at: http://www.swfinstitute.org/fund-rankings.
105 CNOOC is not a SWF by definition, but according to the con-
trolling interests of  70% it could be approximated as an SWF in 
order to simplify the analysis. See generally COHN, Theodore H. 
Global political economy. 6. ed. Longman, 2012. Ch. 9.
Dubai Ports World (“DPW”) in 2005 and 2006 that was 
blocked in the Unites States for failing to pass CFIUS’s 
national security review has raised public awareness of  
SWF investments. This awareness intensified after the 
2007 financial crisis during which period significant 
members of  the world’s financial community including 
the Citigroup, Merrill Lynch, Morgan Stanley, the Stan-
dard Chartered Bank, and UBS accepted large influxes 
of  cash from SWFs.106 In 2010, 20 countries decided to 
establish their own SWFs. An overwhelming majority 
of  the 20 countries are developing countries or so called 
emerging market countries.107 As of  the end of  2018 
and according to the estimate, the overall assets held by 
the world’s largest SWF alone (Norway’s Government 
Pension Fund – Global) is US$10 trillion.108 According 
to the US Government Accountability Office Report, 
SWFs were projected to hold assets worth US$17 tri-
llion (roughly the size of  the US economy) by 2017.109 
In contrast, the total assets under management of  pri-
vate equity firms, which are far more numerous than 
SWFs, are estimated to be only approximately US$3.8 
trillion as of  2014, with only some very large firms ap-
proaching US$50 billion.110
Although Western countries remain suspicious of  
investment activities conducted by SWFs, especially 
with reference to national security, corporate governan-
ce and financial stability issues, the advantages of  this 
kind of  state investments could not be ignored. First 
of  all, SWFs with large inflow of  cash investment are 
important resources of  finance for companies who su-
ffered distresses during the financial crisis. In addition, 
the participation of  SWFs in worldwide investment ac-
tivities links the interests of  capital exporting countries 
with capital importing countries. For example, when a 
106 O’BRIEN, Clare; MATTEI, Tania; THOMAS, Naveen. Sover-
eign wealth funds: evolving perceptions and strategies, securities & 
regulation law report. Bloomberg BNA Securities and Law Report, v. 44, 
n. 50, p. 1, 2012.
107 UNCTAD. World Investment Report. 2011. Available at: http://
unctad.org/en/PublicationsLibrary/wir2011_en.pdf.
108 NORWAY wealth fund grows to record 10 trillion crowns. 
Reuters, Oct. 25, 2019. Available at: https://www.reuters.com/arti-
cle/us-norway-swf-record/norway-wealth-fund-grows-to-record-
10-trillion-crowns-idUSKBN1X41AO.
109 CANUTO, Otaviano; GIUGALE, Marcelo (eds.). The day after 
tomorrow: a handbook on the future of  economic policy in the devel-
oping world. Washington DC: The World Bank, 2010.
110 2015 Preqin Global Private Equity & Venture Capital Re-









































































































Chinese SWF invests in a UK bank, China has a vested 
interest in the performance of  the UK economy.111
Accompanied by the “Go Globally” strategy112 and 
the Belt and Road Initiative, the Chinese government 
has employed a combination of  investment strategies 
by engaging its SWFs to conduct overseas investment 
as a way to maximize state wealth and reputation, and 
investing abroad to secure access to natural resources. 
Energy and metals are principal investment areas and 
account for nearly 70% of  outflows since 2005.113 In 
2019, China’s outbound mergers and acquisitions in the 
power and utilities sector was US$9.5 billion.114
Apart from the SWFs, the main form of  state invest-
ment is the state-owned enterprises or SOEs. Through 
the form of  SOEs, sovereigns are able to act as ow-
ners and investors and operate businesses and assets in 
a corporate veil like privately owned companies. There 
is little difference in functionality between SWFs and 
SOEs. Both represent the core of  networks of  public-
-private investment coordination in which wealth or 
profit maximization is blended with political objectives 
directed by the state even though there exist a variety 
of  subtle differences between SWFs and SOEs as listed 
in Table 2 below. Chinese SOEs are sovereign in the 
sense that their ownership vest, directly and indirectly, 
in the state, and direct state oversight. Recently both 
state ownership and state oversight were reduced given 
the policy to separate government functions from busi-
ness operations. SWFs however have not considerably 
reduced state ownership and state oversight. SOEs no-
wadays are no longer corporate expressions of  publicly 
controlled economic activity, and function like privately 
held enterprises. Related to the key theme covered in 
this article, the issue of  sovereign immunity probably 
111 DE MEESTER, Bart International legal aspects of  sovereign 
wealth funds: reconciling international economic law and the law of  
state immunities with a new role of  the State. Institute for International 
Law Working Paper No. 20, 2009. Available at: http://ssrn.com/ab-
stract=1308542.
112 For a general description of  China’s “Go Globally” strategy, 
which consists of  a serious of  national policy incentives that are 
used by the Chinese government to encourage its companies to in-
vest abroad, see ALON, Ilan; WANG, Hua; SHEN, Jun; ZHANG, 
Wenxian. Chinese State-owned enterprises go global. Journal of  Busi-
ness Strategy, v. 35, n. 3, p. 3–18, 2014.
113 GURRIA, Angel. China go global. OECD, Mar. 24, 2014. Avail-
able at: https://www.oecd.org/china/china-go-global.htm.
114 E&Y. Overview of  China outbound investment in 2019. Feb. 13, 2020. 
Available at: https://www.ey.com/cn/en/newsroom/news-releas-
es/news-2020-ey-overview-of-china-outbound-investment-in-2019.
does not arise if  one transacting party is an SOE, which 
is neither a foreign state nor likely to be considered as 
part of  the PRC government. This is the position in the 
PRC where SOEs do not enjoy immunity and may be 
sued in the PRC courts. Unless an SOE is carrying out 
a function of  the state, it is not likely to be considered 
as part of  the state, and absolute sovereign immunity is 







































































































Table 2 - Comparison between Chinese SWFs with Chi-
nese SOEs
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Transparency Usually Low (CIC 
being highest) 
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for public listed 
companies 
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As a communist state, China has a long history of  
conducting overseas investment through state owned 
investment entities. However, China’s first SWF - Chi-
na Investment Corporation (CIC) was not incorporated 
until 2007 in order to manage some of  the country’s 
“massive foreign exchange reserves.” It has become the 
second largest sovereignty wealth funds in the world 
with the total assets of  US$940,604 million, right af-
ter the Norway Government Pension Fund Global.115 
According to the objective of  CIC, it is a wholly state 
owned company established “as a vehicle to diversify 
China’s foreign exchange holdings and seek maximum 
returns for its shareholder”.116 Together with the Natio-
nal Social Security Fund, SAFE Investment Company 
(SIC) and China-Africa Investment Fund, these four 
entities are considered the most important SWFs in 
115 SWFI. Top 89 largest sovereign wealth fund rankings by total assets. 
Available at: https://www.swfinstitute.org/fund-rankings/sover-
eign-wealth-fund.
116 For a summary of  the purpose of  CIC a reference to their web-
site is provided, “About CIC”, Available at: http://www.china-inv.
cn/wps/portal/.
China that are coordinating and competing in the global 
investment and financial markets, while the CIC is the 
only officially recognized SWF in China.117
Overall, investment of  Chinese major SWFs could 
be classified into three brief  periods. During the first 
stage of  between 2007 and 2009, investment of  Chi-
nese SWFs was primarily concentrated in the high-risk 
financial sectors by infusing a large amount of  money 
in European and American Reserve banks. For exam-
ple, CIC has invested about US$10 billion in Ameri-
can hedge funds Blackstone and Morgan Stanley since 
2007.118 As a result of  the crisis brought about by sub-
-prime lending, lots of  China’s investments in foreign 
banks and financial institutions went bad. Investments 
in Morgan Stanley, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac burned 
these funds badly.119 To recover economic losses and 
reshape investment strategies, the Chinese SWFs ap-
pointed an advisory board of  economic and investment 
experts to provide counsel on international economic 
environment, corporate governance, development stra-
tegy, and investment policy, as well as upgrading and 
improving their corporate image and increasing trans-
parencies.120 Learning from the mistakes of  the first 
period, during the second stage roughly between 2009 
and 2012, Chinese SWFs started to invest more heavily 
though the acquisition of  shares in existing companies 
in developed countries, and in more diversified areas 
including real estate, natural resources and agriculture, 
and have started to conduct longer term investment in 
developing countries. Since 2012, more Chinese SWFs 
become interested in high-tech areas and combined 
portfolio investments. Chinese SWFs are also heavily 
interested in investing in public sectors including health 
care, education and materials. This diversification of  the 
investment portfolio was undertaken to reduce invest-
ment risks. For example, in 2014, CIC invested US$1.6 
117 CIEŚLIK, Ewa. Investment strategy of  sovereign funds from 
emerging markets: the case of  China. Bulletin of  Geography: Socio-
Economic Series, v. 24, p. 27-28, 2014.
118 KOCH-WESER, Iacob N.; HAACKE, Owen. China investment 
corporation: recent developments in performance, strategy, and gov-
ernance paperback. CreateSpace Independent Publishing Platform, 
2014.
119 KOCH-WESER, Iacob N.; HAACKE, Owen. China investment 
corporation: recent developments in performance, strategy, and gov-
ernance paperback. CreateSpace Independent Publishing Platform, 
2014.
120 KOCH-WESER, Iacob N.; HAACKE, Owen. China investment 
corporation: recent developments in performance, strategy, and gov-








































































































billion dollars in the London Heathrow Airport, which 
has made it one of  the major controlling investors of  
Heathrow Airport Holdings together with a number 
of  other SWFs including Qatar Holding and GIC.121 
There has also been a switch to indirect investments 
which are conducted through subsidiaries and partner-
ship companies of  SWFs providing financial assistance 
to Chinese overseas companies. As one of  the drafters 
of  Santiago Principles, CIC has been seen to have im-
plemented these principles in good faith.122 Therefore, 
the Chinese efforts to coordinate sovereign investment 
through coordinating its SWFs present a potentially 
substantial advance in the integration of  programs of  
sovereign investing, public policy, and private markets. 
This integration suggests that it may be possible for a 
state to employ a policy of  politically motivated inter-
ventions in foreign markets and markets for control that 
is, simultaneously, financially motivated.
As a financial hub, Hong Kong remains strategically 
important to Chinese outbound investment although 
destinations including the United States, Australia, and 
South Korea have started to catch up as these places 
receiving FDIs with Chinese origins. Hong Kong had a 
laissez-faire policy which is aimed at promoting barrier-
-free trade and investment. In addition, Hong Kong 
enjoys a unique advantage under the Mainland-Hong 
Kong Closer Economic Partnership Arrangement whi-
ch was first concluded in June 2003123 with the purpose 
of  promoting closer economic collaboration between 
two sides. Under the CEPA, prominent preferential li-
beralizations for goods and services of  Hong Kong to 
enter the China market was announced and it in general 
has provided better terms than China’s WTO commit-
ments.124 According to UNCTAD World Investment 
Report 2015, Hong Kong remains the second largest 
economy for FDI outflows and the key entrepot of  Chi-
121 PEREZ, Santiago. Qatar holding buys 20% stake in BAA for 
$1.4 billion. The Wall Street Journal, 17 Aug. 2012. Available at: http://
www.wsj.com/articles/SB1000087239639044437510457759524297
7156080.
122 CARR, Chris. ’National interest’ concerns and uncertain in-
vestment regime are impeding important investments by sovereign 
wealth funds. Harvard Business Review Online, v. 67, n. 3 2013. Avail-
able at: http://www.hblr.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/03/Carr_
National-Interest-Concerns.pdf.
123 Law of  the People’s Republic of  China on Judicial Immunity 
from Measures and Constraints of  the Property of  Foreign Cen-
tral Banks, Law on Judicial Measures Over Assets of  National Bank 
(2005).
124 Mainland and Hong Kong Close Economic Partnership Act 
(2003).
na.125 According to official government statistics of  
Hong Kong, China was the destination of  53.7 percent 
of  Hong Kong’s re-exports in the year of  2015, whi-
ch means that a majority of  the direct investments in 
China are channeled through Hong Kong.126 The pre-
sence of  large amount of  assets of  SOEs of  China in 
Hong Kong have posed serious threats that these assets 
are going to be subject to collection efforts of  foreign 
creditors, as Hong Kong’s common law tradition and 
its robust legal system has ensured the possibility of  
Chinese enterprises being sued in Hong Kong, statistics 
have shown that at least 9 Chinese SOEs had to defend 
themselves in Hong Kong CFA through the years of  
2005 to 2015.127
In the socio-ethnographic research conducted by 
Ching Kwan Lee over Chinese state capitalism in Zam-
bia, she argued that Chinese SOEs not only seek profit-
-maximizing but also to pursue “the nation’s strategic, 
lifeline, security interests” through political patronage, 
influence, and access to communities.128 Actually, most 
of  the international reporting systems are not applica-
ble to China. As it is not currently a member of  the 
OECD it does not need to follow the OECD Reporting 
System. Nor does it belong to the UN Conference on 
Trade and Development’s 2012 “Principle on Promo-
ting Responsible Sovereign Lending and Borrowing”. 
China’s policy banks which finance the majority of  its 
SWF overseas investments, including most of  ongoing 
Belt and Road Initiative (“BRI”) projects, are a black 
box of  governance, at least to Western investors. This 
form of  stack-backed capitalism, labelled as a form of  
populism129 and utilized to boost diplomatic and politi-
cal interests of  the party-state, are distorting the current 
international financial order designed to maintain the 
balance between profit-seeking private companies and 
125 UNCTAD. World Investment Report 2015. Available at: http://
unctad.org/en/PublicationLibrary/wir2015_en.pdf.




127 Data gathered from Hong Kong Court of  Final Appeal Judg-
ments in Decided Cases. Available at: http://www.hkcfa.hk/en/
work/cases/judgments/index.html.
128 LEE, Ching Kwan. The specter of  global China: politics, labor, and 
foreign investment in Africa. 2018. p. 32-33.
129 HEDRICK-WONG, Yuwa. China, populism, and the demise 










































































































important interests of  less developed nations.
The recently concluded DP World v. Djibouti arbi-
tration case is an excellent illustration of  such tension 
presented. In 2014, DP World Djibouti FZCO filed an 
arbitration claim against the government of  Djibouti 
before the London Court of  International Arbitration 
(“LCIA”), seeking damages, interest and restoration 
of  its right of  development according to a concession 
agreement giving DP World exclusive control over all 
ports in Djibouti.130 The concession agreement entered 
into between DP World and Djibouti back in 2004 pro-
vided DP World with control over Djibouti ports for a 
thirty-year period. Due to disagreement arisen between 
the two parties during the cooperation, in 2012 Djibou-
ti signed an agreement with China Merchants for new 
developments of  its ports. In early 2018 Djibouti termi-
nated its contract with DP World through a presidential 
decree and nationalized all of  its assets, even though it 
continued to pursue projects with the China Merchants. 
DP World accused the Djibouti government of  illegally 
breaching the concession contract, and brought arbitra-
tion against it at the LCIA. In 2018, an LCIA tribunal 
rendered its decision in favor of  DP World, asking Dji-
bouti to restore DP World’s rights to run the projects 
for the remaining term under the concession. Howe-
ver, the Djibouti government has in a public statement 
openly refused to honor the arbitral award in defending 
its nation’s highest interests.131 To many, this represents 
the growing influence of  China over African nations 
due to its strong financial capacity to invest through sta-
te-owned vehicles, which blends new form of  geopoli-
tical relationship backed by access to large amount of  
credit in domestic politics.132 These vehicles are actively 
influencing or even shaping international legal norms 
and practices, the new ones most friendly to state inte-
rests they represent.
Private corporations and multinational enterprises 
(“MNEs”), on the other hand, challenged by populist 
and anti-globalization sentiment and unprecedented 
130 DP World Djibouti FZCO v. Djibouti, London Court of  Interna-
tional Arbitration.
131 DJIBOUTI rejects court ruling to hand back container ter-
minal. The Wall Street Journal, Jan. 17, 2020. Available at: https://
www.wsj.com/articles/djibouti-rejects-court-ruling-to-hand-back-
container-terminal-11579296713.
132 DJIBOUTI rejects court ruling to hand back container ter-
minal. The Wall Street Journal, Jan. 17, 2020. Available at: https://
www.wsj.com/articles/djibouti-rejects-court-ruling-to-hand-back-
container-terminal-11579296713.
expansion of  state-backed investment vehicles, are 
struggling with increasing transaction costs when they 
come to deal with the markets and supply chains. Taking 
into account these nonmarket threats and uncertainties, 
MNEs have to re-strategize or re-engineer their growth 
in a much more tightly controlled legal framework. The 
new wave of  nationalism and protectionism creates a 
salient need for more investigation into the nonmarket 
threats and strategies. Under this narrative, MNEs are 
now operating their businesses in an environment of  
nationalist rhetoric and mercantilist behavior. Increased 
anti-globalization sentiment and legislation (including 
those in disguise of  national security) require MNEs to 
adjust and adapt their corporate strategies. They are fa-
cing political risk and regulatory uncertainty stemming 
from government policies in nationalist and protectio-
nist nature.
Threatened by the rise of  these transnational vehi-
cles, MNEs in their more transparent structure can 
develop strategies and statics to manage and mitigate 
anti-global challenges. In order to enhance competitive 
advantages in contexts where nationalism and geopo-
litical risk is at a high stake, transnational private go-
vernance may need to be reconceptualized, preparing 
for legal changes and lawful responses in these contexts. 
Hopefully we can generate new theoretical insights into 
the relationship between nonmarket threats and lawful 
responses in relation to government policies, socio-po-
litical risk, institutional uncertainty, and an anti-global 
business environment.
5 Conclusions
Populism can be viewed as an ideology, a discour-
se, a movement, or a political strategy. In the spirit of  
its ambiguity, it is worth theorizing populism, and dis-
cussing theories of  populism that challenge or extend 
the existing norms, rules and regimes. There appears a 
new generation of  populists on the global stage, offe-
ring contradictory and disturbing visions regarding the 
world’s future.133 The debate over the role of  globaliza-
tion, sustainable development,134 rule of  law and global 
133 FRIEDEN, Jeffry. The backlash against globalization and the 
future of  the international economic order. In: The next phase of  glo-
balization: capitalism and inequality in the industrialized world. 2018.
134 POPULISM: consequences for global sustainable develop-







































































































justice indicates the institutional weakness and resilien-
ce of  domestic or international mechanisms.
Conflicts in populism centres on globalization and 
polarization,135 at least in the areas of  international law 
and global governance.136 The accelerated diffusion of  
populism after the latest global financial crisis cannot be 
a coincidence. Past financial crises were usually followed 
by a radicalization of  political ideologies as well as by 
the rise of  new extremist social movements. A financial 
crisis can easily turn the blame onto the political and 
economic establishment. As globalization is closely in-
terconnected with global financial crisis, they both crea-
te shocks and take blames.
The core of  the populist ideology has profoundly 
reshaped social and political cleavages at the national 
and international level.137 Both the national and inter-
national politics are confronted with populist move-
ments that challenge their technocratic and nationalist 
frameworks. The failures of  globalization projects have 
provoked contestations today.
The rise and spread of  populism pose a vital threat 
to the world order. We discussed challenges posed by 
the growing influence of  populism to bilateral rela-
tionships, international mechanisms, and transnational 
private actors. National politicians advocate or pursue 
the dismantling of  international institutions by taking 
steps backwards. The justification of  this claim rests on 
the complaint over globalization. However, solutions 
cannot be found by reverting to unilateralism. Some of  
the most pressing policy issues require global solutions. 
International institutions need to be enhanced and 
tasked with a much broader scope of  duties so as to 
gain more legitimacy. The populist movement is taking 
the world order to the opposite direction of  globaliza-
tion. In the years to come, we may see a much more 
populist, fragmented and state-centric world order.
https://www.die-gdi.de/uploads/media/BP_8.2019.pdf.
135 HANDLIN, Samuel. The logic of  polarizing populism: 
state crises and polarization in South America. Sage Jour-
nals, 2018. Available at: https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/
full/10.1177/0002764218756922.
136 OFFICE OF THE REGIONAL CHIEF ECONOMISTS. Po-
larization and populism: Europe and Central Asia economic update. 
Nov. 2016. Available at: http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/
en/494811479976405381/pdf/Polarization-and-populism.pdf.
137 MÜLLER, Philipp; SCHEMER, Christian; WETTSTEIN, 
Martin; SCHULZ, Anne; WIRZ, Dominique S.; ENGESSER, Sven; 
WIRTH, Werner. Populist attitudes in the public: evidence from a 
panel study in four European democracies. Journal of  Communication, 
v. 67, n. 6, p. 968-992, 2017.
In an era of  populism, along with tense instabili-
ty, persistent uncertainty and fragile eco-structures, the 
politics of  populism and an appeal to nationalism and 
unilateralism globally are endangering the liberal world 
order.138 Viewed as a feature of  contemporary world po-
litics, populism places global justice and rule of  law at a 
high stake of  risk. Given the limits in institutional deve-
lopment and stability, the old premise that inspired deve-
lopment of  world order and international law in the past 
has opened up the liberal world order to illiberal values139 
and regimes,140 and become brittle in the face of  new glo-
bal threats facing countries when they move from survi-
val to sustainability. The ongoing coronavirus pandemic 
seems to suggest that, as predicted by some already, insta-
bility and populist unrest is the new world order.141
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